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Abstract
GPS spoofing is a problem that is receiving increasing scrutiny due to an increasing number
of reported attacks. Plenty of results have been reported on detecting the presence of GPS spoofing
attacks. However, very few results currently exist for the localization of spoofing attackers, which is
crucial to counteract GPS attacks. In this paper we propose leveraging vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nications to detect and localize spoofing attacks on vehicular navigation GPS. The key idea is to
correlate Doppler shift measurements which are reported by most commercial GPS receivers. The
approach does not need additional dedicated devices and is easily deployable on modern vehicles
equipped with vehicle-to-vehicle communication devices. It is capable of localizing both stationary
spoofers and mobile spoofers which could be mounted on a vehicle. Both numerical simulations and
experimental tests are conducted to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the Problem
The global positioning system (GPS) has become a crucial navigation system for all kind
of transportation systems, ranging from planes to ships to cars or even on phones for pedestrians.
Furthermore, GPS can also be used for accurate time acquisition, which is crucial for the operation
of power systems, banking systems, and stock exchange. Unfortunately, despite being ubiquitous
and vital in modern society, GPS is also vulnerable to attacks for a couple of reasons. First,
commercial GPS receivers are unable to use encrypted signals from GPS satellites and have to rely
on unencrypted messages, which are easy to replicate for an attacker. Also, due to the long distance
from GPS satellites to ground GPS receivers, the signals reaching the receivers are extremely weak.
In fact, the power of GPS signals received on the Earth is as low as 10−16 Watts [24]. Thus, an
attacker can easily transmit a stronger signal and drown out the authentic signal.
1.2 GPS background
GPS functions by having a constellation of satellites of known position circling the Earth.
Each satellite transmits a unique signal down towards GPS receivers located on the Earth. When
the receivers process the signals they can determine the time from when the satellite transmitted
the signal to when the signal reached the receiver. By multiplying this time by the speed of light,
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as seen in equation 1.1, the distance from the satellite can be calculated.
ri = c(tu − tsi) (1.1)
In this equation, ri represents the distance from the receiver to satellite i, c represents the
speed of light, tu is the time the signal reaches the receiver, and tsi is the time that receiver i
transmits the signal. If three satellites are visible to the receiver simultaneously, the receiver could
determine the distance to each satellite and then use the process of multilateration to determine its
own position. A diagram of this can be seen in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: A diagram describing the basic process for use of multilateration to determine receiver
position from [40].
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Unfortunately, this process is only valid if the time synchronization between all of the
satellites and the receiver is very precise. Because the time delay is being multiplied by the speed
of light, even a very small error in time can result in significant errors in position. The satellites use
atomic clocks, which have the precision capabilities necessary to remain synchronized almost exactly,
but this technology is too expensive to feasibly deploy in every GPS receiver. Therefore, the error
caused by the lack of precision in the receiver clock needs to be accounted for in the calculations.
This is done by computing a pseudorange from the receiver to each satellite. A pseudorange
is the combination of the actual distance from the satellite to the receiver and the additional calcu-
lated distance due to the time delay in the receiver clock. This can be represented symbolically as
seen in equation 1.2:
ρi = c((tu + but)− tsi) (1.2)
where ρi is the pseudorange from the receiver to satellite i and but is the clock bias error caused by
the receiver.
Thus, a system of equations of pseudoranges to different satellites can be compiled as seen
in equation 1.3:

ρ1 =
√
(x1 − xu)2 + (y1 − yu)2 + (z1 − zu)2 + bu
ρ2 =
√
(x2 − xu)2 + (y2 − yu)2 + (z2 − zu)2 + bu
ρ3 =
√
(x3 − xu)2 + (y3 − yu)2 + (z3 − zu)2 + bu
ρ4 =
√
(x4 − xu)2 + (y4 − yu)2 + (z4 − zu)2 + bu
(1.3)
where xi, yi, and zi are the x, y, and z coordinates of satellite i respectively, xu, yu, and zu are the
x, y, and z coordinates of the receiver respectively, and bu is the error in distance calculated due to
the time offset in the receiver clock.
As can be seen from equation 1.3, in order to account for the error due to the time offset
now four satellites are required instead of just three as displayed in figure 1.1. However, if at least
four satellites are visible to the receiver, equation 1.3 can be solved iteratively to find the values of
xu, yu, zu, and bu. This results in the receiver not only being able to determine its exact location,
but also to determine the error in its clock, which can then be neutralized in time synchronization
applications.
3
1.3 GPS Attacks
There are two main types of attacks on GPS receivers: jamming and spoofing. Jamming
is the simpler of the two forms, simply involving transmitting noise over GPS frequencies in order
to disrupt legitimate signals. This prevents the receiver from calculating its position. Jamming is
well understood in the literature [17],[27], and has also been demonstrated numerous times in the
real world [26],[2]. Luckily, jamming attacks are typically easy to detect. On the other hand, a
spoofing attack is the process in which an adversary generates and transmits a fake signal in order
to fool GPS receivers. As the attacker can force the receiver to believe it is in a different location
than it really is, spoofing can allow the attacker to lead the victim off course. Multiple reports have
discussed the dangers of this form of attack, which can include severe consequences such as steering
planes into mountains or ships into hijacking traps [10],[16].
GPS spoofing has already been demonstrated in real world scenarios. In one demonstration,
researchers were able to successfully spoof a yacht at sea and steer it off course [3],[9]. Even more
concernedly, it is believed that in 2011 Iran was able to spoof the GPS in a CIA stealth drone, fooling
it into landing in a spot where they could capture it in order to reverse engineer the technology [34].
These and other such incidents [15],[36],[20] demonstrate the pressing need for security solutions for
GPS navigation.
The first step in combating spoofing is detection, which has received substantial attention
in the past decade. A literature review of some of the reported results is included in section 1.4.
However, even if spoofing can be detected, there is currently not much that can be done about it.
There is no way to regain the true signal, and very little research has been reported on locating the
attacker. For airborne attackers Jansen and coauthors use crowdsourcing in air planes to localize
an attacker [18], which is further improved by [22]. However, this approach relies on dedicated
infrastructure, i.e., the OpenSky Network [5], which includes over 700 air traffic communication
sensors located all around the world. Such infrastructure unfortunately does not exist for other
GPS applications, such as cars.
Yu et al. also attempts to localize an attacker, by using a network of GPS receivers of fixed
location, which are typically used for time synchronization in the power grid [41]. However, once
again this requires a network of GPS receivers with known locations. In the case of a power grid
the receivers are fixed in position, so this is a valid assumption. However, for moving vehicles this
4
method would no longer be applicable.
This paper proposes to localize spoofing attackers on vehicular GPS by correlating Doppler
measurements from multiple vehicles connected with vehicle-to-vehicle communications. Given that
vehicle-to-vehicle communication radios are commercially available and commercial GPS receivers
have the capability to measure incoming signals’ frequencies (see table 1.1 for some examples), the
approach does not require dedicated hardware. Both numerical simulations and hardware tests are
performed to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Table 1.1: Commercial GPS receivers reporting Doppler shift
Brand Device Cost
U-blox NEO-M8T $75 [4]
SkyTraq NS-RAW $70 [7]
NVS RasPiGNSS $170 [12]
Swift Piksi Multi GNSS Module $595 [8]
NovAtel OEM625S unknown
1.4 Literature Review on Detection of GPS Spoofing
Numerous approaches have been proposed to detect GPS spoofing [30]. One approach to
thwart GPS spoofing is to use cryptograph. For example, a navigation message authentication
(NMA) based approach is proposed in [35],[29]. In NMA, the navigation message is encrypted or
digitally signed with the intent that a receiver can use this information to observe the origin of the
signal it is receiving. Other cryptographic defense approaches such as hidden markers [21] have also
been examined. Unfortunately, cryptographic defenses have a few major disadvantages. First, these
defenses are still vulnerable to replay attacks, where the attacker records a legitimate signal and
broadcasts it with a delay [28],[1]. More importantly, these methods require changes to the GPS
legacy system. Due to the static nature of the GPS infrastructure and the long deployment cycles,
making changes to the legacy system would be costly and time consuming, and is therefore unlikely
to occur in the near future.
Non-cryptographic approaches have also been reported to secure GPS. One non-cryptographic
method requires cross-correlation of the P(Y) code with a secure receiver [23],[11],[31]. A high cor-
relation value between the secure and insecure receivers implies that both are receiving the same
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valid signal. Such correlation based detection can also be performed among several cooperative peers
[14]. Unfortunately, this method requires additional high-speed sampling devices to receive raw GPS
signals on which the correlation can be performed.
Another method for spoofer detection is SPREE [33]. SPREE is a new form of GPS receiver
that uses auxiliary peak tracking to check for similar signals. Since real signals still exist in the
presence of a spoofing attack (they are simply overshadowed by the more powerful spoofing signals),
the presence of two signals of differing power but similar peaks would indicate the presence of both
an authentic signal and a spoofed signal. This would alert the receiver to the presence of a spoofing
attack. While this method is quite powerful at detecting attacks, it unfortunately requires hardware
upgrades to existing receivers that would be expensive.
Finally, one other option for GPS spoofing detection is to use multiple antennas [39],[19],[25],
[37],[38],[32]. If the attacker is spoofing multiple receivers using only one antenna, all receivers will
be spoofed to the same location, which would indicate the presence of an attacker. Even if the
attacker uses multiple antennas, having multiple receiving antennas still greatly limits the possible
locations from which the attacker can successfully operate, which makes spoofing significantly more
difficult. However, this method relies on having multiple receivers with known and fixed relative
distances, which is not always feasible.
In summary, while there are several methods available for detecting spoofing, they all tend
to require either hardware upgrades or alterations to the legacy GPS system which limits their
widespread applications to commercial GPS navigation receivers.
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Chapter 2
Models and Approach
2.1 Attacker Model
This paper considers an attacker transmitting spoofing signals using an omnidirectional
antenna. In this case if multiple targets are spoofed they will lock on the same spoofing signal and
report the same location. Thus, if multiple vehicles in a network begin reporting the exact same
location, that would indicate the presence of a spoofing attack. Once spoofing is detected, attempts
to localize the attacker can begin.
This paper considers two main cases: a stationary attacker and a moving attacker. Note
that most of existing results consider stationary attackers. We also consider moving attackers where
the attacker can place its transmitter in, e.g., a moving vehicle.
In both the stationary attacker case and the moving attacker case the attacker is assumed
able to vary the frequency at which it transmits fake GPS signals. In order to transmit a valid GPS
signal the attacker must transmit at a frequency within a few hundred Hertz of the standard satellite
transmission (roughly 1575.42 MHz) [40]. However, within this range the attacker is assumed to have
full control of the frequency at which they can transmit, including the ability to change frequencies
in real time.
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2.2 Victim Model
This paper considers a set of moving receivers located on different vehicles. These vehicles
travel on the same road and can communicate with each other using vehicle-to-vehicle communica-
tions. Each vehicle can record the frequency of the incoming GPS signal, which is reported by most
commercial GPS receivers. Each vehicle also has full knowledge of the speed at which it is going
and the distance it has traveled between consecutive measurements of the signal frequency. This is
reasonable as a vehicle can get the distance information from its odometer. We do not assume that
a vehicle knows its exact location.
Each vehicle uses a standard commercial GPS receiver, which reports incoming signal fre-
quencies. Most existing commercial GPS receivers report such measurements. Note that due to the
loss of synchronization between receiver clocks and the genuine GPS clocks, these measurements
could be subject to errors. We circumvent such errors by using the relative difference between two
consecutive measurements in the computation, as will be detailed in section 2.3.
2.3 Approach
2.3.1 Static Spoofer Case
Figure 2.1 shows a schematic of our setup in which we consider n = 2 vehicular GPS
receivers for the simplicity of exposition. Each receiver takes frequency measurements at m different
positions, where m is a positive integer. The receivers will experience some Doppler shift with
the signal transmitted from the attacker because of the relative speed between them. Thus, the
frequency measured at each point by a given receiver i can be described by the following equation:
f =
(
c+ Vi
c
)
fs +  (2.1)
where f is the measured frequency, fs is the frequency at which the spoofer transmits signals, Vr
is the line of sight velocity of the receiver with respect to the spoofer, c is the speed of light, and
 is the error in the receiver.  is caused by the difference in the clocks between the receiver and
the GPS satellites. It can be eliminated by considering the difference between different samples.
Although some error will still occur from oscillator drift, over short sampling times this will tend to
8
Attacker
v1,1 v1,2 v1,3 v1,m
θ1,1
d1,1−2
d1,1−m
v2,1
v2,2 v2,3 v2,m
d2,1−2
d2,1−3
θ2,1
Figure 2.1: A diagram of the receivers and the attacker. There are two receivers, 1 and 2, each of
which takes measurements atm different instances of measuring time. Each receiver has knowledge of
the speed it is moving at each time as well as the distance it has traveled since the first measurement.
be minimal [13]. For instance, the difference in frequency in receiver i between the first measurement
and the jth measurement, where j is some integer between 2 and n, can be represented as follows:
∆fi,1−j = fi,1 − fi,j =
(
c+ Vi,1
c
)
fs,1 −
(
c+ Vi,j
c
)
fs,j (2.2)
As we do not assume that the spoofer is using a constant frequency in signal transmission, we used
fs,1 and fs,j to denote the respective frequencies at which the spoofing is transmitting when the
first and jth measurements were conducted. This equation can be simplified as follows:
∆fi,1−j =
1
c
(fs,1V1,1 − fs,jVi,j) + fs,1 − fs,j (2.3)
The line of sight velocity of receiver i at time j with respect to the attacker is unknown and can be
represented as:
Vi,j = vi,j cos(θi,j) (2.4)
where vi,j is the speed of receiver i at time j and θi,j is the angle between receiver velocity and its
direction with respect to the attacker, as illustrated in figure 2.1. Combining equations (2.3) and
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(2.4) leads to:
∆fi,1−j =
1
c
(fs,1v1,1 cos(θ1,1)− fs,jvi,j cos(θi,j)) + fs,1 − fs,j (2.5)
Furthermore, based on the geometry of the formation, cos(θi,j) can be represented in terms of
variables referencing receiver 1 at the first time sample, described below:
cos(θi,j) =
ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j√
(ri,1 sin(θi,1))2 + (ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j)2
(2.6)
where ri,1 is the distance from receiver i to the attacker when the first measurement was conducted,
and di,1−i is the distance between receiver i’s first and jth measurements. This relationship can
then be substituted into equation (2.5), resulting in the following equation:
∆fi,1−j = fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
fs,1vi,1 cos(θi,1)−
1
c
(
fs,1vi,j(ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j)√
(ri,1 sin(θi,1))2 + (ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j)2
)
(2.7)
Equation (2.7) can be further rewritten as:
∆fi,1−j = fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
fs,1vi,1 cos(θi,1)− fs,1vi,j(ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j)√
r2i,1 + d
2
i,1−j − 2ri,1di,1−j cos(θi,1)
 (2.8)
Representing cos(θi,1) with x, equation (2.8) can be simplified to the following:
∆fi,1−j = fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
fs,1vi,1x− fs,1vi,j(ri,1x− di,1−j)√
r2i,1 + d
2
i,1−j − 2ri,1di,1−jx
 (2.9)
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This same method can be used for every measurement point made by receiver 1, as well as for all
other receivers. This ultimately results in the following system of equations:

∆f1,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2 + 1c
(
fs,1v1,1x− fs,1v1,2(r1,1x−d1,1−2)√
r21,t+d
2
1,1−2−2r1,1d1,1−2x
)
∆f1,1−3 = fs,1 − fs,3 + 1c
(
fs,1v1,1x− fs,1v1,3(r1,1x−d1,1−3)√
r21,t+d
2
1,1−3−2r1,1d1,1−3x
)
...
∆f1,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m + 1c
(
fs,1v1,1x− fs,1v1,m(r1,1x−d1,1−m)√
r21,1+d
2
1,1−m−2r1,1d1,1−mx
)
∆f2,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2 + 1c
(
fs,1v2,1x− fs,1v2,2(r2,1x−d2,1−2)√
r22,1+d
2
2,1−2−2r2,1d2,1−2x
)
...
∆f2,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m + 1c
(
fs,1v2,1x− fs,1v2,m(r2,1x−d2,1−m)√
r22,1+d
2
2,1−m−2r2,1d2,1−mx
)
...
∆fn,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2 + 1c
(
fs,1vn,1x− fs,1vn,2(rn,1x−dn,1)√
r2n,1+d
2
n,1−2−2rn,1dn,1−2x
)
...
∆fn,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m + 1c
(
fs,1vn,1x− fs,1vn,m(rn,1x−dn,1)√
r2n,1+d
2
n,1−m−2rn,1dn,1−mx
)
(2.10)
Suppose there are n receivers, each conducting m measurements, then n(m − 1) equations
in (2.10) can be constructed. In these equations, there are 2n+m unknowns, ie. θ for each receiver,
r for each receiver, and fs transmitted at each time instance. Therefore, when m is larger than 6, we
have n(m+1) > 2n+m, and hence can solve for the unknowns in (2.10). Using the same argument,
we can know that three receivers only require five measurements per receivers and four or more
receivers only require four measurements per receiver. However, any number of receivers can take
additional measurements per receiver to potentially improve accuracy. As such, once this system of
equations is solved, the position of the attacker is known relative to each receiver. Note that since
the cosine of an angle can correspond to two different angles, there are two possible solutions. Due
to the symmetry of the problem, it is impossible to narrow it down to only one solution, so both
locations would have to be investigated to localize the attacker.
The above approach to calculating ri,1 and θi,1 hence obtaining the location of the spoofer is
applicable only when the measurements are noise-free. Given that the measurements are always sub-
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ject to noise, we choose to estimate the location of the spoofer by solving the following optimization
problem:
min
X∈Rd
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=2
E2i,j
X = (θ1,1, θ2,1, ..., θi,1, r1,1, ..., ri,1, fs,1, ..., fs,j)
(2.11)
where Ei,j is the error for car i at sample j, which is the difference between the measure Doppler
shift and the Doppler shift calculated based on the chosen parameters or:
Ei,j = ∆fi,1−j − fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
fs,1vi,1x− fs,1vi,j(ri,1x− di,1−j)√
r2i,1 + d
2
i,1−j − 2ri,1di,1−jx
 (2.12)
Solving for (2.11) gives the optimal solution for this problem.
2.3.2 Mobile Spoofer Case
Just like in the stationary spoofer case, in the moving spoofer the position of an attacker
can also be calculated by examining the difference between Doppler shifts at different measurement
points. However, in this case the Doppler shift is not only affected by the motion of the receivers
but also by the unknown motion of the attacker. Therefore, the difference in Doppler shifts between
two measurement points can be characterized by the following equation for receiver i:
∆fi,1−j = fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
(fs,1(Vi,1 + Vs,1)− fs,j(Vi,j + Vs,j)) (2.13)
where Vi,1 and Vi,j are the line of sight velocities of the victim with respect to the spoofer when con-
ducting the first and jth measurements respectively and Vs,1 and Vs,j are the line of sight velocities
of the spoofer when the first and jth measurement were conducted by receiver i, respectively.
Just like in the stationary spoofer case, the line of sight velocities are not known. So it is
represented as follows:
Vi,j = vi,j cos(θi,j) (2.14)
where vi,j is the magnitude of the velocity of the victim, which is known to vehicle i, and θi,j is the
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angle that vehicle i’s velocity makes with the direction to the spoofer.
All line of sight victim velocities at future times can also be represented in terms of θi,1.
Based on the geometry of the problem, cos(θi,j) can be represented as follows:
cos(θi,j) =
ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j + T ∗ vs cos(θs)√
r2y,i,j + r
2
x,i,j
(2.15)
where
ry,i,j = ri,1 cos(θi,1)− di,1−j + (i− 1)T ∗ vs cos(θs) (2.16)
and
rx,i,j = ri,1 sin(θi,1) + (i− 1)T ∗ vs sin(θs) (2.17)
Here, T is the sampling period of the receiver.
In order to represent the attack motion’s influence on the measured Doppler shift a similar
process can be completed. Once again, the velocity of the spoofer can be multiplied by the cosine
of the angle it makes with the receiver. However, since the angle the attacker’s velocity makes with
each victim is constantly changing, it cannot be represented as a single variable and must therefore
be defined by multiple other variables for each time instant. For instance, the angle that the velocity
of the spoofer makes with receiver i at the jth time instant can be represented as:
θs,i,j = θs + 180− θi,j (2.18)
where θs,i,j is the angle that the spoofer’s velocity makes with receiver i at time j and θs is the angle
the attacker’s velocity makes with the vertical axis, which is assumed to be the same during vehicle
i’s m samples.
Furthermore, the angle the velocity of the spoofer makes with receiver i at other time
instants can be represented in terms of variables from the first time instant, as can be seen below
for the jth time sample:
θs,i,j = θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θi,j)) (2.19)
where cos(θi,j) can be represented as demonstrated in equation (2.15).
Therefore, equations (2.14) through (2.19) can be substituted into equation (2.13) to produce
13
the following equation:
∆fi,1−j = fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
(fs,1(vi,1cos(θi,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θi,j))− fs,j∗
(vi,j cos(θi,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θi,j))))) (2.20)
A similar equation can be created for each receiver at each sample after the first. This
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results in the following system of equations:

∆f1,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2+
1
c (fs,1(v1,1cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θ1,1))− fs,2
∗(v1,2 cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θ1,2)))))
∆f1,1−3 = fs,1 − fs,3+
1
c (fs,1(v1,1cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θ1,1))− fs,3∗
(v1,3 cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θ1,3)))))
...
∆f1,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m+
1
c (fs,1(v1,1cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θ1,1))− fs,m∗
(v1,m cos(θ1,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θ1,m)))))
∆f2,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2+
1
c (fs,1(v2,1cos(θ2,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θ2,1))− fs,2∗
(v2,2 cos(θ2,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θ2,2)))))
...
∆f2,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m+
1
c (fs,1(v2,1cos(θ2,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θ2,1))− fs,m∗
(v2,m cos(θ2,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θ2,m)))))
...
∆fn,1−2 = fs,1 − fs,2+
1
c (fs,1(vn,1cos(θn,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θn,1))− fs,2∗
(vn,2 cos(θn,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θn,2)))))
...
∆fn,1−m = fs,1 − fs,m+
1
c (fs,1(vn,1cos(θn,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θn,1))− fs,m∗
(vn,m cos(θn,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θn,m)))))
(2.21)
Once again, suppose there are n receivers, each conducting m measurements. This allows for
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the construction of n(m− 1) equations in (2.21). In these equations there are 2n+m+ 2 unknowns,
which once again include θ for each receiver, r for each receiver, and the transmitted frequency,
fs, at each time instant. However, in this case the spoofer also has an unknown speed, vs, and
direction, θs. Thus, when n is 3 and m is 6, we have n(m − 1) > 2n + m + 2, and can thus solve
for the unknowns. Using the same argument, we can say that as the number of receivers increases
the number of required measurements decreases. However, any number of receivers can still take
additional measurements to potentially improve accuracy. Therefore, once this system is solved, the
position of the attacker is known relative to each receiver and the speed and direction of the attacker
is also obtained. Note that once again the symmetry of the problem leads to two potential solutions,
which would both need to be investigated.
Similarly to the stationary case, noise in the system prevents it from finding an actual
solution. Therefore, once again it is necessary to minimize localization error based on the following
optimization problem:
min
X∈Rd
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=2
E2i,j
X = (θ1,1, θ2,1, ..., θi,1, r1,1, ..., ri,1, fs,1, ..., fs,j , vs, θs)
(2.22)
where Ei,j is the error between the measured Doppler shift and the Doppler shift calculated based
on parameters, as demonstrated below:
Ei,j = ∆fi,1−j − fs,1 − fs,j + 1
c
(fs,1(vi,1cos(θi,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− θi,1))−
fs,j(vi,j cos(θi,1) + vs cos(θs + 180− cos−1(cos(θi,j))))) (2.23)
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Chapter 3
Evaluation Based on Numerical
Simulations
3.1 Simulation Setup
Attacker
Receiver 1
Receiver 2
v1,i
v2,i
Perpendicular Distance: A
Relative Distance: D
h
Figure 3.1: A diagram of the spoofer setup used in numerical simulations.
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Numerical simulations were first conducted to verify the effectiveness of our attack localiza-
tion approach.
In the simulation it is assumed that all vehicles travel along the same road with the same
constant speed, ie. v1,j = v2,j , 20 m/s, as illustrated in figure 3.1. This setting involves three
parameters, the relative distances between consecutive receivers (D), the perpendicular distance
from the attacker to the receivers (A), and the parallel distance from the front vehicle to the attacker
(h). The influence of these parameters as well as the number of samples/cars on the localization
performance were systematically evaluated.
For each simulation, a test was run where the approach outlined in section 2.3 was used to
calculate the position of the attacker relative to each receiver. The results of a typical test can be
seen in figure 3.2. In this figure, the blue rectangles represent the receivers, which are moving in the
positive y-direction, the red circle represents the spoofer, and the blue and light blue circles are the
calculated positions of the attacker relative to each receiver.
As can be seen from figure 3.2, each test resulted in two sets of possible locations for the
attacker. This is due to the symmetry of the problem and is unavoidable. In a real-world scenario,
both sets of calculated positions would need to be investigated, but for the purposes of this analysis
only the calculations nearest to the spoofer are examined. The error in each test is said to be the
distance from the true position of the spoofer to the calculated position of the spoofer relative to
each receiver.
Similar results were gathered in the moving spoofer scenario. Figure 3.3 depicts the results
of a standard moving spoofer simulation. Once again, the receivers are represented as blue rectangles
and are moving in the positive y-direction. Furthermore, the attacker is still represented as a red
circle, although a red circle is included for the attacker position at every time sample. However in
this case, the attacker position is calculated relative to the receiver at each position.
Once again, due to the symmetry of the problem this approach will generate two possible sets
of solutions. Figure 3.3 only displays one of these solutions for clarity, but either one is equally likely.
Once again, for this analysis only the nearest solution was examined, but for practical applications
both solutions would have to be considered. The spoofer’s position is calculated at the time of
each measurement, however for these simulations the analysis focused on error at the first position
because once the first position and the speed of the spoofer are known, the spoofer’s position at any
other time can be calculated trivially.
18
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
X axis (m)
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Y 
ax
is
 (m
)
Figure 3.2: Typical simulation results for the stationary spoofer case.
3.2 Influence of Number of Samples
Setting D equal to 10 meters, A equal to 100 meters, and h equal to 145 meters, we first
evaluated the performance of the algorithm under different number of samples. To emulate measure-
ment noise Gaussian noise with standard deviation of .05 was added. Three cases were considered,
with the number of vehicle receivers set to 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Each vehicle recorded a mea-
surement every three seconds. The errors of localization for the three cases with different numbers
of samples are illustrated in figure 3.4. In the figure, we run each test for 100 runs. Note that in the
2-car case no data is given when the number of samples is 5, as in this case the number of samples
is not enough to arrive at a solution.
It can be seen that as the number of samples increases the average error consistently de-
creases. This was expected as additional data should allow for more accurate calculations. Further-
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Figure 3.3: Typical simulation results for the moving spoofer case.
more, as the number of vehicles increased the average error also decreased.
Similar simulations were carried out for the mobile spoofer case. Samples were still collected
every three seconds by each vehicle and Gaussian noise was assumed to have a standard deviation
of .05.
These simulations were conducted for two different formations of moving spoofers: one
where the spoofer is moving at a 45 degree angle relative to the receivers (figure 3.5) and one where
the spoofer is on the same road as the receivers but traveling in the opposite direction (figure 3.6).
In both formations, all victims were assumed to be on the same road driving in the same direction.
In figure 3.6 the perpendicular distance, A, is set to 5 meters to reflect the distance to the other side
of the road. Furthermore, the spoofer and the receivers are all moving at the same speed, 20 m/s.
Figure 3.7 displays the localization error in the first formation. Once again, it can be
seen that the localization becomes more accurate with additional samples and vehicles. A similar
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Figure 3.4: The influence of the number of samples (m) on localization performance in the static
spoofer case.
simulation was conducted for the second formation, as illustrated in figure 3.8. However, in this
case it can be seen that increased numbers of samples had no effect on the localization accuracy.
Figure 3.8 shows the results for the three car case, but the four and five car plots are identical,
revealing that an increased number of vehicles also has no effect on localization accuracy under
these conditions. This is reasonable because the only change in Doppler shift occurs when a vehicle
passes the spoofer, so adding additional measurements at other points does not actually lead to
additional useful information.
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Attacker
vs
vs
vs
vs
v1,1 v1,2 v1,3 v1,m
v2,1 v2,2 v2,3 v2,m
Figure 3.5: A diagram of the formation examined where the attacker moves at a 45 degree angle
with the receivers. Only two receivers are shown here due to space constraints.
Attacker
vsvsvsvs
v1,1 v1,2 v1,3 v1,m
v2,1 v2,2 v2,3 v2,m
Figure 3.6: A diagram of the formation of the receivers moving in the opposite direction of the
attacker on the same road.
3.3 Influence of Parallel Distance, h
We also evaluated the influence of h, the parallel distance from the front vehicle to the
attacker, on the localization performance in figure 3.9. As can be seen, the error starts fairly high
for low values of h before decreasing, staying relatively constant for some time, and then increasing
again. If h continues to increase past the plotted values, the error increases far more dramatically.
This trend holds true for different numbers of vehicles and indicates that this method is most accurate
when the receivers pass the attacker during conducting measurements. This is to be expected as
this will allow for the greatest range in changing Doppler shifts.
The effect of changing h was also evaluated in the moving case illustrated in figure 3.5, as
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Figure 3.7: The influence of the number of samples (m) on localization performance in the moving
spoofer case illustrated in figure 3.5.
can be seen in figure 3.10. Similarly to the stationary spoofer case, the error at first decreases with
increasing h and then begins to increase again. Once again, this demonstrates that our method is
most effective where the receivers cross the spoofer.
3.4 Influence of Perpendicular Distance, A
The effect of the perpendicular attacker distance, A, was also evaluated for both the sta-
tionary and moving spoofer cases. Figure 3.11 displays the effect of A in the stationary case. In
general, as A increases so does the calculated error. However, if A is too low, such as when it is
equal to 10 meters, the error is also high.
Figure 3.12 demonstrates the effect of changing A in the 45 degree moving attacker case.
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Figure 3.8: The influence of the number of samples (m) on localization performance in the moving
spoofer case illustrated in figure 3.6.
Just like in the stationary case, as A increases so does the calculated error.
3.5 Influence of the Relative Vehicle Distance, D
Finally, simulations were conducted to evaluate the influence of D, the relative distance
between receivers. Figure 3.13 displays the average error with changing D for the stationary spoofer
case. As can be seen, the error generally decreases as D increases, which makes sense because
at greater values for D the Doppler shift is more different for different receivers. However, after a
distance of 60 meters, the average error increases dramatically, to as much as several hundred meters
of error. This is not shown in figure 3.13 as the difference in error will obscure the trends in the
first 60 meters. This effect is most pronounced with more receivers due to the fact that with more
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Figure 3.9: The influence of the distance h on the localization performance for the static spoofer
case.
receivers the distance from the front receiver to the back receiver is greatly affected by the distance
between each receiver. Therefore, once the back receiver gets too far away the method is no longer
able to function effectively.
Figure 3.14 displays the effect of changing D in the moving spoofer case illustrated in figure
3.5. Unlike the stationary case, the error in the moving case increases fairly consistently with an
increase in D. Thus, the moving spoofer case is most accurate at low relative distances between
receivers. This is because the numerical solver used to localize the spoofer in the moving system
assumes that θi,1 is very similar for each receiver. As D increases, this is no longer true, especially
with additional receivers, so the solver is no longer able to reach an accurate solution. As such, this
method is only effective to localize moving attackers when distances between receivers are small.
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Figure 3.10: The influence of the distance h on the localization performance for the moving spoofer
case illustrated in figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.11: The influence of the attacker distance, A, on the localization performance in the static
spoofer case.
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Figure 3.12: The influence of the attacker distance, A, on the localization performance for the moving
spoofer case illustrated in figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.13: The influence of the relative receiver distance, D, on localization performance for the
static spoofer case.
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Figure 3.14: The influence of the relative receiver distance, D, on localization performance for the
moving spoofer case.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation Based on Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this method in a more realistic scenario, hardware
experiments were also conducted. Unfortunately, due to laws prohibiting spoofing in the open, we
hard-wired the spoofer and GPS receiver and used aluminum shielding to prevent any signal leakage.
To emulate the influence of Doppler shift due to the relative movement between the receiver and
spoofer, we hard coded the calculated Doppler shift into the spoofer signal.
The USRP B210 from Ettus Research was used as the spoofing device which can transmit
signals simultaneously over two channels. The spoofing was accomplished using the gps-sdr-sim
spoofing library [6], which can be found publicly online. This library can be used to transmit a
spoofing signal to any predetermined location. In this experiment it was simply transmitted with
an overall frequency offset in order to represent the Doppler shift.
The receivers used in this experiment were the NEO-M8T Ublox receivers. These receivers
have capabilities comparable to most standard commercial receivers. The basic experimental setup
is diagrammed in figure 4.1.
After the frequencies were obtained at each measurement point they were processed using
Matlab.
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Figure 4.1: A diagram of the basic experimental setup. The USRP B210 simultaneously transmits
signals over two channels to two separate GPS receivers. These would be shielded in aluminum to
prevent signal leakage.
4.2 Experimental Results: Stationary Spoofer
We first evaluated the influence of perpendicular distance (A) and receiver relative distance
(D) on the localization performance, with results illustrated in figure 4.2.
As can be seen in the plot, the localization error first decreases with an increase in the
distance from the spoofer (A), but then increases with an increase in A. This is consistent with the
numerical simulation results in figure 3.11.
Figure 4.3 displays the effect of the perpendicular distance (A) at additional distances of D
that were tested. This figure once again demonstrates the trend of relatively high error with very
low values of A followed by an increase in error with increasing A. Once again, this is supported by
the numerical simulations.
Figure 4.4 displays the ratio of the average error to the distance from the attacker. As
already discussed, there is a very large amount of error at distances very close to the attacker, such
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Figure 4.2: The average calculation error at different distances from the attacker and different
relative vehicle distances.
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Figure 4.3: The average calculation error at additional distances from the attacker and different
relative vehicle distances.
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Figure 4.4: The ratio of the average calculation error to the distance from the attacker to the
receivers.
as only 10 meters away. This error is not shown in figure 4.4 as it is large enough to obscure the rest
of the trends. After the large error however, there is a dramatic decrease in error leading to the least
relative error at a distance of 50 meters away from the attacker. Then, there is a gradual increase in
relative error as the distance from the attacker increases. This means that the algorithm is actually
becoming less accurate as the attacker distance increases, and is especially inaccurate at very low
values of A. Therefore, depending on the required precision, this method seems best suited for an
attacker distance between about 50 and 200 meters. Figure 4.4 only displays the data for a relative
vehicle distance of 50 meters, but the trends remains similar for all relative vehicle distances.
The influence of relative distance between vehicles, D, on the localization performance was
also evaluated. The results are given in figures 4.5 and 4.6. This demonstrates the patterns found
in changing distances in between receivers. As can be seen, the general trend is fairly consistent
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Figure 4.5: The average calculation error at different perpendicular distances from the attacker and
different relative vehicle distances.
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Figure 4.6: The average calculation error at additional perpendicular distances from the attacker
and different relative vehicle distances.
regardless of distance from the attacker. More specifically, the localization error first decreases
and then increases with an increase in the relative distance, which is consistent with the numerical
simulation results in figure 3.13.
Once again, it was desired to see the trend as a ratio of the error to the distance to the
attacker. Therefore, figure 4.7 displays this ratio at different values of D, the relative receiver
distance. Figure 4.7 specifically shows the error ratio at an Attacker distance of 50 meters.
As can be seen, figure 4.7 confirms the trend that average error tends to decrease as D
increases. However, after a certain point the process begins to break down and error increases
dramatically. Furthermore, the three car case breaks down before the two car case, which was an
effect observed in the numerical simulations seen in 3.13 as well.
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Figure 4.7: The ratio of the average calculation error to the distance from the attacker to the
receivers at different relative receiver distances.
4.3 Experimental Results : Mobile Spoofer
Due to time constraints, more limited experiments were conducted for the moving spoofer
scenario. Instead of examining multiple variables across a set range of values, the moving spoofer
case was only evaluated experimentally in two main cases. These two cases were based on the
formations displayed in figures 3.5 and 3.6, with each victim being 50 meters apart. Once again, the
experiments were conducted by using the USRP B210 to transmit signals to the receivers with the
calculated Doppler shift hard coded in.
Figure 4.8 displays the error calculated at each time instance for the moving spoofer in the
opposite direction of the victims. As can be seen, the error starts at five meters, but then steadily
increases with each successive position. This is because there is some error when calculating the
magnitude and direction of the spoofer’s motion, which propagates throughout the calculated posi-
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Figure 4.8: The average error calculated for each position based on experiments for the moving
spoofer on the same road in the opposite direction of the victims.
tions. The first position always has an error of exactly five meters because while the vertical starting
point is calculated correctly, the algorithm consistently determines that the spoofer is directly inline
with the victims, while it really has an attacker distance of five meters. This could possibly be
improved by using finer steps when iterating initial values, as in this experiment the steps were all
the size of ten meters. However, this would lead to longer processing times.
Overall, the calculation error at any position for this formation is always less than 25 meters
for any position. This is definitely sufficient for helping the authorities locate the spoofer. However,
it should be noted that this only works if the attacker passes the victims. Otherwise the same
problem exists as in the case where the spoofer is moving in the same direction as the victims: the
Doppler shift is never changing so it is impossible to come to a solution.
Figure 4.9 displays the calculation error from the case where the spoofer moves at a 45 degree
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Figure 4.9: The average error calculated for each position based on experiments for the moving
spoofer moving at a 45 degree angle relative to the victims.
angle relative to the victims. The error in this formation is consistently higher than that encountered
in the previous formation. Furthermore, in this case the error decreases the first few positions before
once again increasing. The decrease in error is due to the fact that the error calculated for the first
position is in the opposite direction of the error calculated in the motion of the spoofer. This is not
guaranteed to happen, but in the five trials run did lead to a decrease in calculated error through
the first few positions.
All positions in figure 4.9 have calculated errors between 20 and 50 meters, and must cal-
culated errors are between 30 and 40 meters. Once again, this should be a reasonable enough range
to greatly narrow down the possible locations of the spoofer. This is especially true when it is
considered that the spoofer is traveling along a road, which helps further narrow down its possi-
ble locations. Therefore, in both cases it is possible to calculate the position of the spoofer to a
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reasonable degree of accuracy.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Evaluation of Results
In this paper we propose using a network of cooperative vehicles to localize a spoofing
attacker through use of their respective Doppler shifts. Each vehicle takes Doppler measurements
over a short period of time, and then based on the changes in each Doppler shift a system of equations
can be generated. Minimizing the error in this system of equations reveals an estimate of the location
of the attacker.
The methods proposed in this paper have been demonstrated to be effective under certain
circumstances. For the stationary attacker, when the distance from the attacker is between about
50 and 200 meters and the relative distance between vehicles is between about 50 and 100 meters,
the ratio of the calculation error to the attacker distance is typically less than 0.2. This does not
precisely localize the attacker, but it does greatly narrow down the possible locations. This would
permit authorities to have a much smaller search radius, and thus a much easier time finding an
attacker.
For the moving spoofer, the algorithm was able to calculate the position of the spoofer to
within 50 meters of error regardless of whether the attacker was moving the other direction of the
victims or on a different road that crosses with the victims. However, this does require making a
number of assumptions, such as the fact that the spoofer is moving at a relatively constant velocity
in a constant direction. Furthermore, this method is limited in that it will not work if the attacker
is moving in the same direction at the same speed as the victims, which is unfortunately quite likely
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if the spoofer is on the same road as the victims. Therefore, the algorithm proposed in this paper is
capable of localizing moving attackers, although it does have some significant limitations.
5.2 Future Work
As mentioned previously, all the data in this paper was gathered in laboratory simulations.
Thus, moving forward this method would have to be tested under more realistic conditions, which
would require permission to spoof GPS signals in an open environment. Under such conditions the
noise from the spoofer will no longer be an issue (the transmitted signal will definitely be the same for
every receiver at a given point in time), although there will be some additional noise in the position
and velocity of each vehicle. The amount of noise in those areas would depend on the accuracy of the
odometer readings. Therefore, it is expected that the results would be similar to those encountered
in this paper, but further testing would be required to ensure this. Furthermore, in a real world
scenario the receivers should be able to record more than the minimum number of required data
points. As demonstrated by the numerical simulations for both the stationary and moving spoofer
cases, with more samples the accuracy of the process can be improved at least slightly.
This method can also be generalized in a few ways. First, in this paper it is assumed that all
vehicles are moving in a perfectly straight line. At times this would be a reasonable approximation,
as cars should be following roads, which are generally fairly straight. However, some roads curve or
turn and this method does not currently account for that. It would be possible for the mathematics
to be generalized to allow cars to turn, although this would require each car to be able to determine
its turning angle. This information is not readily available through the odometer for most vehicles,
so this generalization would be significantly more difficult to implement.
This method also makes numerous assumptions about the moving spoofer, as previously
mentioned. Without these assumptions the number of variables required increases greatly, which
requires the use of more vehicles and measurements. Furthermore, as the complexity of the system
of equations increases so too does the processing time required to solve it. As such, it is currently not
practical to solve for a spoofer moving without restrictions. Unfortunately, in order to be actually
implemented this is a problem that would need to be solved.
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5.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, the algorithm proposed in this paper works effectively for localization of
stationary attackers within certain distance ranges. It also shows promise for localization of moving
spoofers, although more work would be required to get around the necessary restrictive assumptions.
This method also still needs to be tested in real world environments and would require a network of
vehicles, but could prove to be an affordable means of detection and localization of GPS spoofing
attacks.
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